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The pivotal role of metaphor in the
evolution of human language
Abstract: There is broad agreement among evolutionary linguists that the
emergence of human language, as opposed to other primate communication
systems, is characterised by two key phenomena: the use of symbols, and the
use of grammatical structure (Tomasello 2003). In this paper, we show that
these two defining aspects of language actually emerge from the same set of
underlying cognitive mechanisms within the context of ostensive-inferential
communication. We take an avowedly cognitive approach to the role of meta-
phor in language change, setting out how general capacities such as the recog-
nition of common ground, the inference of meaning from context, and the
memorisation of language usage, can together lead to the conventionalisation
of metaphors, and thence to systematic changes in language structure, includ-
ing the development of grammatical linguistic units from formerly meaningful
elements through grammaticalisation (Hoefler and Smith 2009). We show that
the relevant cognitive competences are general-purpose mechanisms which are
crucially not specific to language; they also underpin non-linguistic communi-
cation, where the same processes lead to the emergence of apparently arbitrary
symbols.
1 Introduction
The fundamental problem of human language evolution is concerned with pro-
viding explanations of how a linguistic communication system emerged from
a non-linguistic state. Although there are deep and ongoing controversies over
the precise nature of human language (Chomsky, 1995; Hauser, Chomsky, and
Fitch, 2002; Jackendoff, 2002; Langacker, 1987; Tomasello, 2003a), the wider
evolutionary problem is almost always, even by otherwise bitter opponents
(e.g. Bickerton, 2003; Tomasello, 2003b), operationalised into two distinct sub-
problems, namely the emergence of symbolism and the emergence of grammar.
Tomasello suggests, for instance, that:
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[l]anguage is a complex outcome of human cognitive and social processes taking place
in evolutionary, historical and ontogenetic time. And different aspects of language – for
example, symbols and grammar – may have involved different processes and different
evolutionary times. (Tomasello, 2003b, p. 109)
In contrast to this common bifurcation of the problem, we claim instead in this
article that the cognitive mechanisms underlying metaphor can provide a sin-
gle solution to the two evolutionary sub-problems. We thus suggest a unified
explanation of how human language could have initially emerged from ‘no
language’ and then developed complex grammatical structures. We further ar-
gue that these mechanisms actually underpin all human communication, both
linguistic and non-linguistic, from its pre-historical beginnings to the present.
The paper is divided into three main sections: in section 2 we identify the two
fundamental cognitive mechanisms on which metaphor is built, and which
form the foundations of our analysis, namely ostensive-inferential communica-
tion and conventionalisation. We then apply these same mechanisms to ex-
plain both the emergence of symbols (in section 3) and of grammatical struc-
tures (in section 4), before presenting our conclusions in section 5.
2 The cognitive underpinnings of metaphor
Metaphor is a creative process in which an existing linguistic form is used
to express a meaning similar, but not identical, to its conventional meaning
(Kövecses, 2002). Individual metaphors are built on an inferable analogy be-
tween the original and the novel meanings, or the ‘source’ and ‘target’ mean-
ings in Lakoff and Johnson (1980)’s terms. Importantly, however, metaphor is
not a deviant special case of language use, nor is literal use the default setting
for language; metaphorical language use is often speciously considered excep-
tional only because of the seductively erroneous assumption that language is
a tool which enables the speaker to encode meaning and the hearer to decode
it (Wilson and Sperber, 2012). Linguistic communication is, however, not sim-
ply an encoding-decoding process, nor is it even a process of reverse-engineer-
ing in which the hearer puts the speaker’s original meaning back together
again (Mufwene, 2002; Brighton, Smith, and Kirby, 2005); rather it is best char-
acterised by the complementary processes of ostension and inference (Sperber
and Wilson, 1995).
The mutual recognition of common ground between interlocutors is the
crucial cognitive mechanism which underpins ostensive-inferential communi-
cation; it both forms the foundation for the key processes of ostension and
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inference, and enables the use of existing conventions in novel ways. Common
ground, the knowledge the interlocutors assume they share with each other,
has a number of key aspects, including: shared recognition of each other as
potential interlocutors; shared understanding of the goal of the communicative
episode, built on an understanding of the other’s intentions (Tomasello, Car-
penter, Call, Behne, and Moll, 2005); the recognition of relevant content from
the context of the shared communicative episode; and shared conventions,
including existing form-meaning mappings. On the basis of this shared know-
ledge, communication can be established as follows. The speaker1 executes
an ostensive act whose deliberate and atypical nature marks it as potentially
relevant, and thus establishes the speaker’s communicative intention. Further-
more, the ostensive act also invites the hearer to inferentially construct a rele-
vant meaning, using as evidence the ostensive act itself, the context in which
the act is performed, and the existing conventions shared by the interlocutors.
This inferential construction of meaning by the hearer is a fundamentally un-
certain and approximate process, which relies on highly idiosyncratic systems
of knowledge, individually created by the interlocutors from their different cog-
nitive representations of the world and of the context in which the ostensive
act is made, and from their different representations of existing linguistic and
cultural conventions. In such inexact circumstances, non-conventional (i.e.
metaphorical) use of language is inevitable and ubiquitous, and this leads in-
exorably to the fluidity and variability characteristic of language.
Metaphors are defined by the analogical connections which can be drawn
between the source and target meaning, and are interpreted in the same way:
the hearer infers the parts of the source meaning relevant in the communica-
tive context, and constructs an ad-hoc interpretation based on these relevant
semantic fragments. The simple metaphor “John’s a real pig”, for instance,
might be interpreted in various ways, depending on the context in which it is
uttered: it might suggest that John is very messy, that he is very fat, that his
eating habits are messy or gluttonous, or that he behaves very badly, among
many others. The actual meaning constructed by the hearer would depend on
which of these properties, which are conventionally associated with the source
(pigs), appear most relevant and appropriate to the hearer in the current con-
text. The use is clearly metaphorical because the inferentially constructed
meaning is only similar, rather than identical, to the conventional meaning of
‘pig’. In metaphorical usage more generally, the conventional meaning con-
1 Note that we use the terms speaker and hearer in a general sense to denote the communica-
tor and the addressee, independently of whether the mode of communication is vocal or ges-
tural.
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tains more information than the meaning which is intended to be communicat-
ed; its less relevant meaning components (for instance, having a curly tail or
four toes) must be ignored for the communicative episode to succeed. This very
abandonment of the less relevant parts of the conventional meaning during
the ostensive-inferential process, of course, is the key action which renders
the use metaphorical. This ostensive-inferential view of metaphor leads to two
interesting conclusions. Firstly, as Deutscher (2005) points out, there are al-
most always some aspects of conventional meaning which are ignored in a
particular communicative episode, because they are irrelevant in the context;
metaphor is therefore effectively ubiquitous in human communication. Sec-
ondly, we can see that every instance of language use can be placed on a figu-
rative continuum, which runs from true literalness to traditional poetic meta-
phor (Sperber and Wilson, 1995). This continuum from literal to figurative, met-
aphorical language use also encompasses phenomena such as metonymy, in
which an object may be identified by one of its most salient properties, e.g.
reference by a waitress to a particular diner as “The ham sandwich”, cf. Sag
(1981). In such cases the appropriate non-conventional meaning, namely the
identification of a specific individual, is inferred by the hearer as the most
relevant use of the metonymic expression, while the conventional, less rele-
vant, components of its meaning must be ignored (Papafragou, 1999). The figu-
rative continuum can therefore be defined in terms of how much of the conven-
tional meaning is disregarded, and how flagrantly these disregarded compo-
nents clash with the actual meaning communicated.
Successful metaphors, though, are not ephemeral, but rather repeatedly
used and adopted by other speakers. A vital part of our account of the evolu-
tion of both symbols and grammar, indeed, is the process of conventionalisa-
tion through which the originally novel usage of a form becomes conventional
through repeated use. The cognitive process underlying this transformation is
the simple assumption that interlocutors can remember their language use:
whenever a form is used metaphorically, both speaker and hearer can add the
novel form-meaning mappings to their linguistic repertoire. This memorisation
of usage has two important effects: the entrenchment of the new association
between form and meaning in the interlocutors’ individual linguistic know-
ledge, and the establishment of new common ground between them. Expres-
sions become entrenched in people’s knowledge in proportion to their frequen-
cy of use: the more often a form-meaning mapping is used, the more readily
accessible it becomes to the user, so that it can become invoked without the
potentially complex reasoning which allowed its creation in the first place
(Langacker, 1987). A successful metaphorical usage is also new information
which can itself be added to the common ground shared by the interlocutors
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and thus be used as background knowledge in future interactions: this not
only allows the metaphor to be subsequently more easily interpreted, but more
importantly it may also allow the metaphor to be used without its original
licensing context. Both entrenchment and the establishment of new common
ground, therefore, can allow specific metaphorical mappings to become in-
creasingly independent of the context in which they were created. This is
equivalent to the linguistic phenomenon of context-absorption (Kuteva, 2001;
Traugott and Dasher, 2005), in which a meaning which originally had to be
inferred pragmatically from the context comes to be semantically encoded.
Once the meaning is part of the conventional meaning, we can regard the origi-
nal metaphor as having been conventionalised; clear examples of this abound
throughout language and are often dubbed ‘dead metaphors’ (Deutscher, 2005,
p.118). Our claim in this article, however, is that all linguistic constructions
derive from conventionalised metaphors; they are the culmination of originally
ad-hoc ostensive acts whose meanings were inferred from context, memorised
and subsequently entrenched through repeated use.
3 The evolution of symbols
Metaphor is usually considered as a linguistic phenomenon, as the use of a
linguistic symbol in a non-literal manner. We agree with this characterisation
of metaphor – metaphor can act on linguistic symbols – but argue that meta-
phor actually pre-dates symbolism. In this section, we intend to show that met-
aphor is involved in the processes of ostensive-inferential communication that
lead to both (i) the emergence of iconicity and (ii) the emergence of symbolism.
3.1 Iconicity
In a first step, we intend to show that the cognitive mechanisms underlying
the ad-hoc creation and use of an icon in an episode of ostensive-inferential
communication are the same as the ones employed in the creation and use of
an ad-hoc metaphor in present-day linguistic communication. To this aim, we
will first have a closer look at the cognitive mechanisms involved in ostensive-
inferential communication.
The most basic mode of ostensive-inferential communication is that of di-
rect ostension. In this mode, the speaker creates a physical stimulus that allows
the hearer to acquire the information that the speaker intends to communicate.
If it is understood between the speaker and the hearer that, in the given situa-
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tion, it is relevant for the hearer to know whether A or B, then the speaker,
who knows that A, can provide the hearer with the information she requires
simply by showing her that A. If, for instance, a father asks his daughter, upon
her leaving the house, whether she has got her keys, then the daughter can
provide her father with the required information simply by making him see
how she takes her keys out of her pocket and puts them back in.2
Direct ostension does not require that the hearer recognises the communi-
cative intention of the speaker: the hearer will acquire the information that the
speaker wants to pass on to her by observing the speaker’s ostensive act any-
way. The speaker, on the other hand, does need to have an understanding of
the hearer’s communicative needs if he is to produce the right ostensive stimu-
lus under the right circumstances. Note that in some situations, more than one
ostensive stimulus may be available to make the intended information avail-
able to the hearer. If, in such situations, one of these stimuli is chosen more
frequently than the others, the association between this particular stimulus
and the respective meaning may become entrenched to a point where the stim-
ulus will become the conventional way of communicating that meaning. The
deeper the entrenchment becomes, the less important the original connection
between the produced form and the communicated meaning will be: “associa-
tion [which has] become habitual ceases to be association” (Keller, 1998, 110).
The conventionalisation of the use of a particular ostensive stimulus for con-
veying a particular meaning – possibly accompanied by a frequency-induced
change in the form of the stimulus – is one path that can lead to the emergence
of symbolic form-meaning associations. However, this path alone would not
allow a simple communication system to become much more expressive over
time; for a communication system to reach the level of expressivity that one
finds in present-day human language, the cognitive mechanism of metaphori-
cal extension, as it can be first observed in the emergence of iconicity, has to
be in place.
In the iconic mode of ostensive-inferential communication, the speaker
produces a stimulus that does not provide the intended information directly
but whose form shares some conceptual properties with that information:
“[t]he relation between an icon and its denotatum is that of similarity” (Keller,
1998, 102). Suppose, for instance, a young woman asks a fellow student if this
week’s sports practice will include jumping or football, and that fellow student
responds by drawing a circle in the air with his hand. The young woman will
soon realise that a “literal” interpretation, i.e., taking the fact that her friend
2 Keller (1998) calls stimuli that are used for direct ostension symptoms, Deacon (1997) refers
to them as indexes.
The pivotal role of metaphor in the evolution of human language 129
Tab. 1: Comparative schematic analysis of pre-symbolic metaphor and symbol-based
metaphor.
Pre-symbolic metaphor Symbolic metaphor
Example
Communicative A gesture drawing a circle in the The utterance “Sally is a chame-
Situation air with one’s hand is produced leon” is produced in a
in a context where a type of sport context where one refers to a girl
(football or running) needs to be named Sally.
identified.
Analysis
Signal (form) round manual gesture /kǝˈmi:ljǝn/
Signal meaning round manual gesture small appearance-changing reptile
(by ostension) (by convention)
Relevant aspect round appearance-changing
Ignored aspects manual gesture small reptile
Inferred speaker football appearance-changing person
meaning
has made said gesture at face value, does not provide her with any relevant
information: communication, in this case, does not happen via direct ostension
alone. However, as the young woman also realises that her friend would be co-
operative (Grice, 1957), and that he knows that she realises this, she can as-
sume the produced cue to be there to point her to a relevant bit of information.
In the present case, she may come to the conclusion that the shape of her
friend’s gesture resembles the shape of a football (they are both round) but
does not resemble anything related to jumping; she will thus infer that the
meaning her friend intended to communicate is the concept of football rather
than that of jumping.
In an episode of iconic ostensive-inferential communication, the concept
represented by the produced cue does not itself constitute the meaning intend-
ed by the speaker; it is rather transferred, by means of analogy, to the domain
of potentially relevant meanings. An icon is thus an ostensive stimulus used
metaphorically: some aspect of the signal meaning (here, the signal meaning
is the concept represented by the signal itself: a manual gesture in the shape
of a circle) is ignored because it is mutually recognised as irrelevant by the two
interlocutors, while some other aspect of it also occurs in the speaker meaning
and thus serves as a cue that helps the hearer identify the meaning that the
speaker intends to communicate. The schematic comparison given in Table 1
illustrates that icons are pre-symbolic metaphors, i.e., metaphors created be-
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fore the produced signal has been paired, through entrenchment, with a con-
ventional meaning and thus become dissociated from the immediate informa-
tion its form conveys. This analysis suggests that metaphor is a capacity that
pre-dates symbolic communication: as it is grounded in the cognitive mecha-
nisms of ostensive-inferential communication, its use is not limited to symbolic
communication.
3.2 Symbolism
In a second step, we now turn to the role that metaphor plays in the emergence
of a symbolic communication system. Symbols have frequently been described
as conventionalised associations between forms and meanings where the rela-
tionship between form and meaning appears to be arbitrary.3 We have already
discussed how conventionalised form-meaning associations come about: they
emerge if a particular signal is repeatedly used to express a particular meaning,
so that the respective communicative behaviour becomes ritualised and en-
trenched in the collective memory of a population of interlocutors. The ques-
tion that remains to be answered then is how form-meaning associations can
become arbitrary. We contend that metaphor plays a crucial role in this pro-
cess.
In principle, there are two pathways along which a non-arbitrary form-
meaning association can be arbitrary: either the form changes or the meaning
changes. Metaphor is the key to the second pathway: the mechanisms of osten-
sive-inferential communication make it possible for a speaker to use an extant
form-meaning association to convey a novel, metaphorical meaning. The ex-
ample given in Table 1 illustrates the difference between the use of a non-
symbolic and a symbolic metaphor: while in the case of the former, the signal
meaning that the metaphor exploits is created by means of ostension and thus
coincides with the conceptual properties of the produced signal itself, in the
case of the latter, it falls from an extant convention that associates the pro-
duced signal with a specific meaning. The actual metaphorical process, how-
ever, is the same in both cases: the hearer observes that the speaker has ex-
pressed a signal meaning which, if taken literally, does not seem to contribute
in a relevant way to the present interaction. The hearer, presupposing the
speakers’ co-operativeness, then realises that some aspects of the signal mean-
3 We say that the form-meaning association appears to be arbitrary because it is evidently not
arbitrary from a diachronic perspective, i.e., if one knows the causal chain of events that has
led to a symbolic form-meaning association.
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ing do also occur in a potential speaker meaning that would be relevant in the
given context. She thus ignores all irrelevant aspects of the signal meaning and
uses the relevant aspect to infer the presumably intended speaker meaning. In
the given example, the hearer observes the speaker stating that a human girl
called Sally is a chameleon. She realises that, Sally being human, the fact that
chameleons are small reptiles cannot constitute relevant information in the
present context. She then infers that the speaker rather intends to point to
some characteristics that chameleons and Sally share, namely that they both
frequently change their appearance or that they easily blend in with their sur-
roundings.
Once an extant form is used in the same metaphorical sense frequently
enough, the association between that form and its new, metaphorical meaning
will itself become entrenched and conventionalised. The new convention can
then serve again as the starting point for the creation of yet another metaphor.
Repeated metaphorical extension and conventionalisation may thus ultimately
lead to an obfuscation of the original link between the form and the meaning
it is associated with: the relationship between form and meaning becomes arbi-
trary. Metaphor thus allows interlocutors to use extant form-meaning associa-
tions as stepping stones to reach meaning spaces that were so far not covered
by their communication system. In this way, the repeated conventionalisation
of originally metaphorical extensions makes ever new meaning spaces acces-
sible. This cumulative application of metaphor to conventionalised associa-
tions allows the expression of meanings which could potentially not have been
reached in a single inferential step, thus greatly expanding the communicable
meaning space. Even though in present-day linguistic communication, the use
of an ad-hoc metaphor may most often not be motivated by the problem that
the intended meaning could otherwise not be expressed but rather by pragmat-
ic factors such as a need for brevity or social aspects such as the wish to attract
attention, establish prestige by displaying one’s eloquence, or avoid commit-
ting oneself (Pinker, Nowak, and Lee, 2008), in the evolution of human lan-
guage, the creative function of metaphor has played a pivotal role. Without it,
the emergence and evolution of a symbolic communication system as express-
ive as human language may not have been possible.
In summary, our analysis so far suggests that the cognitive and communi-
cative mechanisms involved in metaphor not only pre-date symbolic communi-
cation, but that they also constitute key prerequisites for (i) conventional form-
meaning associations to become arbitrary over time, (ii) for new meaning spa-
ces to become expressible and thus (iii) for originally simple symbolic commu-
nication systems to eventually reach the expressivity that we find in present-
day human languages.
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4 The evolution of grammar
Our analysis has taken an avowedly cognitive approach to language, which
ultimately relies on two principal assumptions, commonly called the symbolic
and usage-based theses (Evans and Green, 2006). The symbolic thesis holds
that language has a fundamentally symbolic function, and therefore that the
central unit of language is an association or mapping between a form and a
meaning, and that an individual’s linguistic knowledge can be described as a
“structured inventory of conventional linguistic units” (Langacker, 2008,
p. 222). The usage-based thesis considers that there is no distinction between
linguistic ‘competence’ and ‘performance’, rather that knowledge of language
consists simply of abstractions of these form-meaning associations from the
situated instances of their use in language. Crucially for our account, the sym-
bolic thesis assumes that meaning is central to all linguistic units, including
not only lexical items, but also grammatical schematic constructions such as
‘the passive construction’ or ‘the intransitive construction’. The idea that both
grammatical constructions and lexical items are inherently meaningful leads
inevitably to the fact that the lexicon and grammar should not be considered
as distinct entities, as in traditional generative grammar, but rather that they
are, in a fundamental sense, the same. Given their common symbolic nature,
it might also therefore be parsimonious to assume that their origins might be
similarly accounted for by the same set of cognitive capacities.
Although there is no fundamental distinction between grammatical and
lexical items in cognitive linguistics, they can nevertheless differ qualitatively
in both form and meaning: whereas a prototypical lexical item has a monomor-
phemic form expressing a concrete, basic-level meaning (such as ‘cat’), gram-
matical items typically have abstract schematic forms which express function-
al, schematic meanings. The passive construction, for instance, has its own
abstract form which specifies both the types of its components and the order
in which they are put together (X be VERB-ed by Y) associated with its own
very general meaning, roughly focusing attention on the patient (X) affected
by the action described by the verb rather than the agent (Y) who actually
carries out the action. The linguistic process through which grammatical struc-
ture is created is traditionally called grammaticalisation, and involves a num-
ber of changes through which lexical items gradually lose their independence
of use and their meanings become more functional (Givón, 1979; Haspelmath,
1998). If we accept the symbolic thesis, then grammaticalisation can be concep-
tualised simply as a process of a symbol moving towards the grammar end of
the lexicon-grammar continuum. The continuum itself is often conceptualised
in traditional grammaticalisation theory using the metaphor of a cline, or a
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natural pathway along which linguistic items ‘travel’ as they become grammat-
icalised (Hopper and Traugott, 2003). With this idea in mind, the focus of our
enquiry now shifts to how items move towards the lexicon end of the lexicon-
grammar continuum: in particular, how do schematic forms emerge, and
where do abstract, functional meanings come from? We suggest that the cogni-
tive capacities which enable metaphor also play a pivotal role in both these
issues.
4.1 Schematic forms
The defining characteristic of schematic forms is that they contain variable
slots which can be filled by multiple possibilities, such as the variables X,
VERB and Y in the form of the passive construction described above. Schematic
forms arise from the process of memorisation, the way in which constructions
are stored, analysed and compared with each other. When a linguistic form is
interpreted, the hearer constructs a meaning from context, and remembers the
connections between form and meaning. These connections can be of essen-
tially arbitrary complexity, depending on how form and meaning are analysed:
the whole form may be mapped to the whole meaning; individual components
of the form may also be mapped to individual semantic components.
But linguistic forms are inevitably structured in a linear fashion with items
being expressed in sequence: this structure itself (the order of the items being
produced) can also be mapped to parts of the constructed meaning. For exam-
ple, the expression of one form a followed by another form b to invite the
inference that the speaker wishes to draw attention to a state of affairs a and
provide further information b about a allows the hearer to infer not only the
mappings a↔ a and b↔ b but also that in a form containing two compo-
nents, the first component refers to the topic of communication and the second
to comment about that topic. It is, of course, no coincidence that the resulting
construction in this case is the basis of the topic/comment and subject/predi-
cate structures which are so pervasive in human languages.
Complex forms (those with multiple components) allow not only this kind
of internal analysis of their own structure, but also external analysis in com-
parison with other complex forms. Two forms ab and ac sharing a sub-compo-
nent a can easily be reanalysed with the shared component as a fixed item,
combined with a variable slot which can be filled with either b or c. Tomasello
(2003a) describes how children’s language emerges in exactly this way, as chil-
dren construct their language from analyses of the language they hear, with
their emergent languages passing through a number of distinct stages. Initially,
children’s two-word combinations contain two roughly equivalent words under
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one intonation contour (e.g. ball table), but they soon develop a more system-
atic pattern, or pivot schema, in which one fixed item determines the function
of the utterance and the other fills in a variable slot (e.g. more juice, more milk).
These basic schemas develop into item-based constructions, frequently based
around verbs, where the roles played by the participants are marked (by word
order, morphology or syntactic markers), but only for individual items; there
are no generalised ‘thematic roles’ like agent or instrument, rather a particular
role might be marked with a preposition in one verb construction, for instance,
but by word order in another verb constructions. Tomasello (2003a) suggests
that more general constructions are then created by children from these item-
based constructions, as cross-construction patterns are found and analogies
made, yielding abstract, adult-like constructions such as the transitive (X
VERB-s Y), where the agent carries out the action of the verb on the patient.
Such abstract schemas can only be constructed because of humans’ prodigious
ability not only to infer the meaning associated with ostensive linguistic behav-
iour, but also more generally to find patterns and make analogies between
existing symbols: these are the very cognitive capabilities which underlie the
creation of metaphor.
Although the examples given show the emergence of relatively simple
schematic forms, there is no reason to doubt that the same process is not impli-
cated in the emergence of more general syntactic patterns from discourse strat-
egies. We thus agree both with Tomasello (2003a) that similar processes, un-
derpinned by the same cognitive capacities, are likely to have occurred in the
evolution of language, and, more generally, with Hopper (1987)’s suggestion
that all grammatical structures emerge from the pragmatic strategies employed
by speakers in discourse.
4.2 Functional meaning
Although much of the literature on grammaticalisation refers to the idea of
semantic loss or bleaching, e.g. “weakening of semantic content” (Givón, 1973)
or “desemanticization” (Heine and Kuteva, 2002), it is probably more accurate
to say that although concrete meanings are lost, there is also a somewhat com-
pensatory gain of abstract meanings which provide more information about
grammatical function, and which of course is the major result of grammaticali-
sation. Heine and Kuteva (2002)’s detailed analysis of grammaticalisation
across a wide sample of the world’s languages shows clearly that unambiguous
patterns of grammatical development recur repeatedly in multiple unrelated
languages. For instance, forms originally meaning back have independently
developed into locational adpositions denoting behind in languages as diverse
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as Icelandic, Halia, Moré, Kpelle, Baka, Aranda, Welsh, Imonda and Gimira
(Smith, 2011). Moreover, these developments are themselves instances of more
general, frequent metaphorical shifts which use the human body as a basic
template to express location; Heine and Kuteva (2002) present examples from
various languages showing the development of adpositions from words mean-
ing belly, bowels, breast, buttocks, eye, face, flank, forehead, head,
heart, mouth, neck, shoulder and side. Although the specific metaphors
used vary from language to language (Heine, Claudi, and Hünnemeyer, 1991),
the most striking feature of these networks is their overwhelming unidirection-
ality; the conceptual shifts are consistently from concrete to abstract, as the
linguistic associations move along the lexical-grammatical continuum de-
scribed above.
The emergence of such grammatical meanings has traditionally been ex-
plained in two different ways in the literature, either via metaphorical exten-
sion (Heine et al., 1991) or via reanalysis (Hopper and Traugott, 2003). We
have, however, previously presented a unified account of grammaticalisation
which characterises both the metaphor- and reanalysis-based approaches in
terms of their underlying general cognitive mechanisms (Hoefler and Smith,
2009), the now familiar foundations of ostensive-inferential communication
and memorisation. We now turn to probably the most famous example of gram-
maticalisation in the literature, the development of the English construction be
going to (Heine et al., 1991; Kuteva, 2001; Hopper and Traugott, 2003; Evans
and Green, 2006; Hoefler and Smith, 2009), and explore how metaphorical
extension can explain the historical grammaticalisation it has undergone. The
be going to construction’s original transparent meaning was motion, but it
has gained additional meanings through the centuries, from intention to a
grammatical marker of futurity, as shown in Example 1. Similar changes (go
to > future in Heine and Kuteva (2002)’s terms) are attested in many lan-
guages across the world and throughout history. They appear, moreover, to
form part of another very general grammaticalisation process in which certain
verbs come to be used to mark specific tense or aspect functions (Heine and
Kuteva, 2002).
(1) a. I am going to play football.
b. I am going to stay at home.
c. It is going to rain.
The historical development of be going to shown in Example 1 also clearly illus-
trates one of the consequences of metaphor conventionalisation, that of layer-
ing (Hopper and Traugott, 2003). When a metaphor is newly memorised, the
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form inevitably becomes part of two competing conventions: the original asso-
ciation and the new metaphorical association. In addition to their different
meanings, these competing layered associations may differ in their level of
entrenchment and in their syntactic properties. Indeed, form-meaning associa-
tions are internal to individuals’ linguistic knowledge, and thus only indirectly
observable through usage. The existence of a truly new association is therefore
only exposed through actualisation (Trask, 1996), when the construction is
used in a context which is only interpretable using the new form-meaning
mapping. Both layering and actualisation can clearly be seen in Example 1. In
1(a), be going to can be interpreted freely as any of the three historical mean-
ings we are considering, as follows: (i) motion: ‘I am moving somewhere to
play football’; (ii) intention: ‘I intend to play football’; (iii) futurity: ‘In the
near future, I will play football’. In 1(b), however, the clear contradiction be-
tween the meanings of go and stay ensures that the motion reading is unavaila-
ble, and only the latter two are possible; the inanimate dummy subject it in
1(c), meanwhile, renders both motion and intention impossible, and obliges
a futurity reading. In modern English, therefore, we can consider that there
is layering of three different be going to constructions, which differ both in
their meanings and in the properties required of their subjects and associated
main verbs. In the earliest, most lexicalised construction, be going to can be
used only in conjunction with main verbs whose meaning is consistent with
actual movement, and with subjects who represent animate beings. In the most
recent, most grammaticalised construction, on the other hand, it is now solely
a tense marker, and as such it can be used with any kind of subject and any
main verb without restriction.
So how does metaphor allow the creation of new associations and their
entrenchment? Let us consider first how the construction which meant motion
could be used metaphorically to mean intention. We must assume that speak-
er and hearer already share the construction, including its conventional mean-
ing of motion, and that they are aware that the convention is shared. The key
additional properties of the situation which are necessary to make the meta-
phor interpretable are twofold: (i) that intention is associated with motion;
(ii) that motion is not relevant in the current communicative context. These
are shown in the first column of Table 2. Because the interlocutors’ shared
contextual knowledge shows that motion is irrelevant, all aspects of the con-
ventional meaning are ignored. Another meaning must be sought, which must
be both sufficiently relevant in the context, and associated with aspects of the
conventional meaning; this association allows the non-conventional (and thus
metaphorical) usage to be successfully inferred through analogy.
The newly conventionalised intention sense of be going to can then act
as a stepping stone for further metaphorical derivation, in the scenario present-
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Tab. 2: Comparative schematic analysis of the metaphorical derivations of, first, intention,
and then, futurity meanings for be going to.
Intention Futurity
Example
Communicative context Meaning of main verb Subject is inanimate,
(e.g. stay) inherently so motion and intention
contradicts motion meaning. meanings are impossible.
Analysis
Signal (form) /bɪgoʊɪŋtu/ /bɪgoʊɪŋtu/
Signal meaning motion (by convention) motion, intention
(by convention)
Shared association motion → intention intention → futurity
Relevant aspect intention futurity
Ignored aspects motion motion, intention
Inferred speaker meaning intention futurity
ed in the second column of Table 2. This shows the increased grammaticalisa-
tion of be going to through the development of the abstract grammatical mean-
ing futurity. In this scenario, the same reasoning applies, but the interlocu-
tors take advantage of slightly different contextual and shared knowledge: (i)
that intention is associated with futurity, because the things we intend to
do happen in the future; (ii) that intention is not relevant in the current com-
municative context, because there is no intentional, animate being in the sce-
nario. Again, all aspects of the conventional meaning (both motion and inten-
tion) are ruled out, but another meaning (futurity) is inferred. The inference
of this meaning can take place because futurity is both associated with an
aspect of the conventional meaning and relevant in the current non-intentional
context. This new, even more abstract, meaning is then associated with be go-
ing to, memorised by the interlocutors, and, over time, conventionalised.
We have argued in this section that the cognitive mechanisms required for
grammaticalisation to take place are that interlocutors share common ground,
and that they can memorise the linguistic usage they experience. If they enter-
tain sufficiently similar assumptions about the constitution of their common
ground, then they will make the same inferences about what is most relevant
in the communicative context, and thus understand the creative meanings
which are expressed metaphorically. If they remember these new associations,
and use them sufficiently frequently, then the new associations can also be-
come conventionalised, and potentially act as the source for further metaphori-
cal extensions. The cognitive mechanisms required for the development of
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grammatical structure, therefore, are exactly the same as those we described
in section 3 as pre-requisites for the emergence of arbitrary symbols and their
subsequent development into massively expressive communicative systems.
5 Conclusion
The problem of language evolution is generally divided into two distinct issues:
the emergence of an arbitrary symbolic communication system and then the
emergence of grammatical structure. We have examined these issues in detail
in this paper, and have described in sections 3 and 4 how the same underlying
cognitive mechanisms are required in both cases. These capabilities, namely
the assumption of common ground between interlocutors, and the memorisa-
tion of experience, are the fundamental components of all ostensive-inferential
communication, and provide the foundation on which the creative power of
metaphor is built. We suggest therefore that metaphor, or rather the cognitive
properties on which metaphor’s creativity depends, may have played a pivotal
role in enabling the origin and evolution of human language.
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